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Abstract. We propose a high-efficiency three-party quantum key agree-
ment protocol, by utilizing two-photon polarization-entangled Bell states
and a few single-photon polarization states as the information carriers,
and we use the quantum dense coding method to improve its efficiency.
In this protocol, each participant performs one of four unitary operations
to encode their sub-secret key on the passing photons which contain two
parts, the first quantum qubits of Bell states and a small number of
single-photon states. At the end of this protocol, based on very little
information announced by other, all participants involved can deduce
the same final shared key simultaneously. We analyze the security and
the efficiency of this protocol, showing that it has a high efficiency and
can resist both outside attacks and inside attacks. As a consequence,
our protocol is a secure and efficient three-party quantum key agreement
protocol.
Keywords: Quantum communication ·Quantum key agreement · Three-
party key agreement · Bell states · Single photons.
1 Introduction
Quantum communication provides an unconditionally secure way for the trans-
mission of information, by exploiting the principles in quantum mechanics. In
recent decades, this field gains much attention of researchers all over the world.
There are many important branches of quantum communication for different
tasks, such as quantum key distribution (QKD) [1,2,3], quantum secure direct
communication (QSDC) [4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12], quantum secret sharing (QSS)
[13], and so on. QKD supplies a secure way for two remote legitimate parties
to create a private key [1,2,3]. The parties in QKD can detect the eavesdrop-
per, say Eve, if she monitors their quantum channel, by picking up a subset
of their outcomes obtained with two nonorthogonal measuring bases to check
eavesdropping. They can then discard the outcomes when they find Eve. Far
different from QKD, QSDC gives an absolutely secure approach for two parties
to transmit their secret message directly, without producing the private key in
advance. The first QSDC scheme was proposed by Long and Liu [4] and it ex-
ploits the properties of Bell states and uses a block transmission technique in
2002. Subsequently, Deng, Long, and Liu [5] clarified the standard criterion for
QSDC explicitly in 2003, and they proposed an important two-step QSDC pro-
tocol by using the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen photon pair blocks . Recently, these
two-step QSDC protocols [4,5] were experimentally implemented by two groups
[6,7]. In 2004, Deng and Long [8] introduced the first QSDC protocol based on a
sequence of single photons, called quantum one-time pad scheme which has been
recently experimentally demonstrated by Hu et al. [9] in a noisy environment
with frequency coding. In 2017, Wu et al. [10] proposed a high-capacity QSDC
protocol with two-photon six-qubit hyperentangled states. QSS is used to share
a secret key among some agents of a boss [13], in which the agents can recon-
struct the secret if and only if they collaborate. QSS has a higher requirement
than QKD because a potentially dishonest agent may injure the benefit of the
boss. The inside attacks will increase largely the difficulty of the design of QSS
schemes in practical applications.
Quantum key agreement (QKA)[14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36]
is another interesting multiparty quantum communication. It is an extension of
classical key agreement [37], by utilizing the principles of quantum mechan-
ics, i.e., quantum no-cloning theorem, Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and the
principle of quantum state superposition. Ways of generating the shared keys
are different in QKA and QKD protocols. In a QKA protocol, a classical final
shared key is derived by two (or more) parties as a function of information con-
tributed by each of them [14], it is generated by all the participants together.
But in a QKD protocol, a shared key is decided by one participant and dis-
tributed to others. A secure QKA protocol needs to satisfy four properties [15]:
correctness, security, fairness, and privacy property. The correctness property
requires that each participant should receive the correct secret key. The secu-
rity property requires that outside eavesdroppers cannot obtain the shared key
without being detected. The fairness property indicates that non-trivial subsets
of the involved participants can determine the final shared key. And the pri-
vacy property requires that the sub-secret key of each participant should not
be learned by any other [15]. Those properties make the QKA protocols more
suitable for open insecure channels, and make it have the extensive application
prospect in open network [16]. Also, they increase the difficulty of designing a
secure QKA protocol. In 2004, Zhou et al. [17] proposed a QKA protocol which
contains two users and utilizes the quantum teleportation technique. In 2010,
Chong et al. [18] proposed a QKA protocol based on the BB84 protocol, utiliz-
ing a delayed measurement technique. Nevertheless, only two users are involved
in the above protocols [17,18]. In 2013, Shi et al. [19] presented a multi-party
QKA (MQKA) protocol by using the entanglement swapping technique. In the
same year, Liu et al. [20] pointed out that Shi et al.’s protocol is not a fair QKA
protocol and then put forward another MQKA protocol with single particles. In
2014, a MQKA protocol using Bell state and Bell measurement was proposed
by Shukla et al. [21]. In 2016, two MQKA protocol were proposed by Sun et al.
with cluster state [22] and six-qubit states [23] respectively. In the same year,
Liu et al. [14] calculated the previous MQKA protocols into three categories:
the complete-graph-type MQKA protocols [16,20], the circle-type MQKA pro-
tocols [15,19,21,22,23,24], and the tree-type MQKA protocol [25]. A circle-type
protocol has a higher qubit efficiency than the complete-graph-type one. But in
Ref. [25], they described an instructional mode of the attacks to the circle-type
MQKA protocols, and claimed that those previous MQKA protocol cannot re-
sist the collusive participant attacks (or called inside attacks). In 2016, Huang et
al. [26] proposed a QKA protocol in travelling-mode utilizing single photons and
rotation operations. In 2017, Cai et al. [27] presented another MQKA protocol
with rotation operations. Subsequently, Cao et al. [28] proposed a MQKA proto-
col based on quantum search algorithm. Recently, Huang et al. [29] put forward
a MQKA protocol with collective detection and rotation operations. Up to now,
many other different QKA protocols have been proposed [30,31,32,33,34,35,36].
In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient three-party QKA protocol
with Bell states, following partially the idea in previous studies [15,24]. In our
protocol, the idea of quantum dense coding is used [38]. Four unitary operations
are used as encoding operations, which are performed by each participant on
passing photons. The passing photons contains two parts, the first quantum
qubits of Bell states and the single-photon states. Our protocol can prevent
dishonest participants learning any useful information about other’s sub-secret
key. It can successfully resist both outside attacks and inside attacks. At the
end of this protocol, all participants involved can deduce the final shared key
simultaneously with very little information about the positions of those single
photons announced by others. Moreover, by using the dense coding method, this
protocol also possess a high efficiency.
2 High-efficiency three-party QKA protocol
In this QKA protocol, three participants, say Alice, Bob, and Charlie, cooperate
to establish a final shared key. The two-photon polarization-entangled Bell states
and some single-photon polarization states will be used in our protocol. Four Bell
states can be expressed as:
∣
∣φ±
〉
=
1√
2
(|00〉 ± |11〉) ,
∣
∣ψ±
〉
=
1√
2
(|01〉 ± |10〉) , (1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 respectively present the horizontal and vertical polarization
states of the single photon. They form a complete orthogonal basis, called Z basis.
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉) form another complete orthogonal
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Fig. 1. The illustration of our three-party QKA protocol. UA (UB , UC) denotes the
unitary operations performed by Alice (Bob, Charlie) according to his (her) secret bit
string KA (KB , KC). The solid arrows present the sequence transmitted through the
quantum channel with the block transmission technique [4].We ignore the eavesdrop-
ping check stages(Step 2, Step 4, Step 6) in this figure for conciseness.
basis, called X basis. We code the two-photon Bell state |φ+〉 as ’00’, |φ−〉 as
’01’, |ψ+〉 as ’10’, |ψ−〉 as ’11’. Furthermore, we code the single-photon state |0〉
as ’0’, |1〉 as ’1’.
In our protocol, according to the idea of quantum dense coding [38], we use
four unitary operations U00 = I , U01 = σz , U10 = σx and U11 = iσy as the
encoding operations. Here σz , σx, σy are the Pauli matrices. If we choose to
perform one of those local unitary operations on the first quantum bit of the
two-photon system in the state |φ±〉 or |ψ±〉, the transformation of those Bell
states can be summarized in Table 1. For single-photon states |0〉 and |1〉, their
transformation by the those operations can be shown in Table 2.
Table 1. The transformation of four Bell states
∣∣ψ±
〉
and
∣∣φ±
〉
by the unitary opera-
tions U00, U01, U10 and U11 performed on the first quantum bits.
U00 ⊗ I U01 ⊗ I U10 ⊗ I U11 ⊗ I∣
∣φ±
〉 ∣∣φ±
〉 ∣∣φ∓
〉 ∣∣ψ±
〉 ∣∣ψ∓
〉
∣
∣ψ±
〉 ∣∣ψ±
〉 ∣∣ψ∓
〉 ∣∣φ±
〉 ∣∣φ∓
〉
Table 2. The transformation of two single-photon states |0〉 and |1〉 by the unitary
operations U00, U01, U10 and U11.
U00 (U01) U10 (U11)
|0〉 |0〉 |1〉
|1〉 |1〉 |0〉
We assume that the classic channel is authenticated in our protocol, and
we utilize the block transmission technique, which was first proposed by Long
et al. [4], to ensure the security of transmission. Three participants Alice, Bob
and Charlie want to establish a final shared key K. Alice, Bob and Charlie first
generate some random bit strings KA, KB and KC as their secret bit strings (or
called their sub-secret key), which can be expressed as:
KA = (a1, a2, . . . , an),
KB = (b1, b2, . . . , bn),
KC = (c1, c2, . . . , cn). (2)
Here ai, bi, ci ∈ {00, 01, 10, 11}, i= 1, 2, . . . n . So the length of the each bit string
is 2n.
The illustration of our three-party QKA protocol are shown in Fig. 1. They can
be described in detail as follows.
(Step 1) Alice (Bob, Charlie) prepares m two-photon systems SA (SB, SC) in
the maximally entangled state |φ+〉 and divides these particles into two ordered
sequences, denoted as SA1 and SA2 (SB1 and SB2, SC1 and SC2), respectively.
Note that, these particles in SA1 (SB1, SC1) are the first qubits of the systems in
|φ+〉, and these particles in SA2 (SB2, SC2) are the second qubits of the systems
in |φ+〉. Alice (Bob, Charlie) prepares kn single photons, which are randomly
in the state {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, as the decoy photons. Then, he (she) inserts
randomly those decoy photons into the sequence SA1 (SB1 , SC1) and sends the
sequence to Bob (Charlie, Alice) through the quantum channel.
(Step 2) After confirming that Bob (Charlie, Alice) has received the sequence,
Alice (Bob, Charlie) announces the positions of the decoy photons and the corre-
sponding basis (Z basis or X basis) for the measurement on each decoy photon.
Bob (Charlie, Alice) picks out and measures the decoy photons according to the
announcement of Alice (Bob, Charlie). They compare the measurement results
with the initial states of the decoy photons. If the error rate exceed the threshold,
they abort the protocol; otherwise, they continue their quantum communication
to the next step.
Certainly, Bob (Charlie, Alice) should exploit the complex eavesdropping-checking
process [39,40] to prevent an eavesdropper, say Eve, to eavesdrop the quantum
communication with Trojan horse attack in this step. As shown in Ref. [40],
he should let each photon received pass through a filter with which only the
wavelengths close to the operating one can be let in, which is used to filter out
Eve’s invisible photons and avoid the invisible photon eavesdropping scheme
with which Eve utilizes the fact that the single-photon detector is only sensitive
to the photons with a special wavelength. Moreover, Bob (Charlie, Alice) should
use a photon number splitter (PNS: 50/50), which is used to divide each signal
into two pieces for some of the decoy photons, to defeat the delay-photon Trojan
horse attack [40].
(Step 3) Bob (Charlie, Alice) randomly inserts l single photons in the state
|0〉 into SA1 (SB1, SC1) to form a new sequence S1A1 (S1B1, S1C1). Note that,
m + l = n, n is the half length of the secret bit strings, and l accounts for a
very small percentage of n. The purpose of inserting single photons here is to
resist the possible attacks from dishonest participants. Then, he (she) performs
the unitary operation Ubi (Uci , Uai) on each photon in S
1
A1 (S
1
B1, S
1
C1) accord-
ing to his (her) secret bit string KB (KC , KA). For instance, if bi (ci, ai)= 00,
Bob (Alice, Charlie) chooses U00 to perform on the ith photon of S
1
A1 (S
1
B1,
S1C1). After the local operations, we denote the new sequence as S
2
A1 (S
2
B1, S
2
C1).
Bob (Charlie, Alice) prepares kn decoy photons which are randomly in the state
{|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}, and inserts them into the sequence S2A1 (S2B1, S2C1). Then,
Bob (Charlie, Alice) sends the sequence to Charlie (Alice, Bob).
(Step 4) After confirming that Charlie (Alice, Bob) has received the sequence,
they perform the second eavesdropping check. The checking method is same as
that in Step 2. If the error rate exceeds the threshold, they abort the protocol;
otherwise, they continue the quantum communication to the next step. Also,
Charlie (Alice, Bob) should exploit the complex eavesdropping-checking process
[39,40] to prevent Eve to eavesdrop the quantum communication with Trojan
horse attack.
(Step 5) After picking out the decoy photons, Charlie (Alice, Bob) performs
the unitary operation on each photon in S2A1 (S
2
B1, S
2
C1) according to his (her)
secret bit string KC (KA, KB) and form a new sequence S
3
A1 (S
3
B1, S
3
C1). The
encoding method is same as that in Step 3. Then, Charlie (Alice, Bob) prepares
kn decoy photons and inserts them into S3A1 (S
3
B1, S
3
C1). After that, Charlie
(Alice, Bob) sends it back to Alice (Bob, Charlie).
(Step 6) After confirming that Alice (Bob, Charlie) has received the sequence,
Alice, Bob and Charlie publicly announce the positions of the single-photon
states that he (she) has insert in Step 3 through the authenticated classic chan-
nel. In order to ensure the correctness of this protocol, Alice, Bob and Charlie
randomly select a set of positions to check whether each participant has received
the correct secret key at the end of this protocol. After that, they perform the
third eavesdropping check. The checking method is same as that in Step 4. If
the error rate exceeds the threshold, they abort the protocol; otherwise, they
continue the quantum communication to the next step.
(Step 7) After picking out the decoy photons, the remaining photons form the
sequence S3A1 (S
3
B1, S
3
C1). Now, Alice (Bob, Charlie) has the sequences S
3
A1 and
SA2 (S
3
B1 and SB2, S
3
C1 and SC2). Note that the length of the sequence SA2
(SB2, SC2) is m, and the length of the sequence S
3
A1 (S
3
B1, S
3
C1) is n. Then
they come to the decoding stage. For these positions where the single-photon
states have been insert, Alice (Bob, Charlie) measures the photons from se-
quence S3A1 (S
3
B1, S
3
C1) in Z basis, and records the bit string of the outcomes
as Ma (Mb, Mc). For the other positions, Alice (Bob, Charlie) performs Bell
measurement on the corresponding photon pairs from S3A1 and SA2 (S
3
B1 and
SB2, S
3
C1 and SC2), and records the bit string of the Bell state measurement re-
sults as MA (MB, MC). Then, Alice (Bob, Charlie) computes KA
′ = MA ‖Ma
(KB
′ = MB ‖ Mb, KC ′ = MC ‖ Mc), where ‖ presents connecting two strings.
After that, Alice (Bob, Charlie) picks out the same positions, as the single-
photon state in S3A1 (S
3
B1, S
3
C1), from the bit string KA (KB, KC). He (She)
keeps the first bits of the two bits and moves them to the end of bit sequence.
After that, he (she) would get a new bit string KA
∗ (KB∗, KC∗). Thus, the
length of KA
∗ (KB∗, KC∗) is same as KA′ (KB ′, KC ′). And it is easy to verify
that KA
∗ ⊕KA′ = KB∗ ⊕KB ′ = KC∗ ⊕KC ′ according to Table 1 and Table 2.
Here ⊕ denotes the addition module 2.
Finally, for each participant, he (she) can get the same final shared key
K = KA
∗ ⊕ KA′ = KB∗ ⊕ KB ′ = KC∗ ⊕ KC ′. Then, they check whether the
final shared key from those positions chosen in Step 6 is consistent. If not, they
they abort the protocol.
3 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of our protocol. For QKA protocol, we
not only need to consider the attacks from outside eavesdroppers, but also need
to consider the inside attacks being done by dishonest participants. Hence, the
security analysis of QKA protocols is more complex than that in QKD protocols.
3.1 Outside Attack
Suppose there is an eavesdropper Eve (not the legitimate participants) who
wants to steal the final shared key without being detected by the legitimate
participants. To achieve this goal, she must obtain participants’ sub-secret key
through some means. Eve mainly has these attack means: intercept-resend at-
tack, measurement-resend attack, entangle-measure attack and Trojan horse at-
tack. Therefore, if we want to demonstrate the security of our protocol against
the outside attacks, we must prove that our protocol can resist all those four at-
tack means. Without loss of generality, we take the situation that the sequence is
generated by Alice, and sends to Bob and Charlie orderly for example to describe
the security of our QKA protocol.
First, let us consider the intercept-resend strategy. Eve intercepts the photons
at the end of Step 1, Step 3 or Step 5, and replaces them with her own photons
to get the sub-secret key of Bob or Charlie. But she cannot pass the eavesdrop-
ping check. Eve couldn’t know the information of the decoy photons which are
randomly in the state {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}. Therefore, the probability that she
will be detected is (1− ( 1
2
)kn
). If kn is large enough, Eve will be detected with
the probability approaching to 100%.
Second, let us consider the measurement-resending attack. Eve intercepts the
photons and measures them at the end of Step 1, Step 3 or Step 5, and then
resends them to Bob or Charlie. However, Eve can’t distinguish between the
target photons and decoy photons before the eavesdropping check process. So
She just randomly chooses the measurement bases. As a result, Eve introduces
many errors in the eavesdropping stage and exposes herself. The probability that
she exposes herself is (1− ( 3
4
)kn
) which will approach to 100% when kn is large
enough.
Now, let us come to the entangle-measuring attack. Eve intercepts the pho-
tons at the end of Step 1, Step 3 or Step 5, and employs a unitary operation on
the ancillary photons |E〉 and the photons she captured.
Suppose the unitary operation is UE , one can have the relations for the
eavesdropping as follows:
UE : |0〉 |E〉 →|0〉 |E00〉+ |1〉 |E01〉 ,
|1〉 |E〉 →|0〉 |E10〉+ |1〉 |E11〉 . (3)
Here |E00〉, |E01〉, |E10〉 and |E11〉 are pure states determined by UE . In this
protocol, we use the decoy photons randomly in the state {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} to
prevent eavesdropping. At the end of Step 1, Step 3 or Step 5, if Eve use the
entangle-measure attack, the states |+〉 ,|−〉 will have the relations:
UE : |+〉 |E〉 →1
2
|+〉 (|E00〉+ |E01〉+ |E10〉+ |E11〉)
+
1
2
|−〉 (|E00〉 − |E01〉+ |E10〉 − |E11〉) ,
|−〉 |E〉 →1
2
|+〉 (|E00〉+ |E01〉 − |E10〉 − |E11〉)
+
1
2
|−〉 (|E00〉 − |E01〉 − |E10〉+ |E11〉) . (4)
If Eve wants to introduce no error in the eavesdropping check in Step 2, Step
4 or Step 6, it must satisfy |E01〉 = |E10〉 = 0 and |E00〉 = |E11〉. If not, the
probability of Eve being detected is (1− ( 1
2
)kn
).
And if Eve uses the entangle-measure attack to entangle the ancillary photons
with the first qubits of |φ+〉, and then one will have the relations:
UE :
∣
∣φ+
〉 |E〉 → 1√
2
(|00〉 |E00〉+ |10〉 |E01〉+ |01〉 |E10〉+ |11〉 |E11〉) . (5)
Hence, if Eve wants to introduce no error (not be detected by the legitimate
participants), we will have UE : |φ+〉 |E〉 → |φ+〉 |E00〉. Her ancillary photons and
the encoded photons are in product states. She cannot get any useful information
from measuring the ancillary photons. And we will come to the same conclusion
when Eve entangles the ancillary photons with other Bell states or single-photon
states. Thus we can say that Eve cannot obtain the sub-secret keys without being
detected if she takes the entangle-measuring attack.
Finally, our protocol may suffer from the Trojan attack, which take use of the
invisible photons. The legitimate participants can use the wavelength quantum
filters and PNSs to resist this attack [39,40].
In conclusion, outside eavesdroppers can not obtain the shared key without
being detected. According to the definitions in Ref. [15], our protocol can reach
the security property of the QKA protocol.
3.2 Inside Attack
The inside attack can also be seen as a violation of the privacy and fairness
property [15]. The inside attack is that one or more dishonest participants want
to predetermine the final shared key without being detected. There are two cases,
having only one dishonest participant, or having two dishonest participants. If
this protocol is immune to two participants attack, it is surely immune to one
participant attack. So we only need to consider the second situation. Suppose
that Alice and Charlie are two dishonest participants, they want to conclude to
determine the final shared key. In our protocol, the transmission route forms a
circle. Choosing another two dishonest participants finally returns to the same
situation.
Alice and Charlie must first get the sub-secret key of Bob KB before the
Step 6. Then they can choose a different unitary operations to preform on the
photons and then send back to Bob, or they tell Bob a fake information about the
positions of single photons to predetermine the final shared key. In this protocol,
the only chance they can get KB before Step 6 is measuring photons in the
S2A1 which have been performed unitary operations by Bob and the photons
in SA2 which has been preserved in their hands in the Step 5. But they do
not know the positions of single photons which are randomly inserted by Bob,
they cannot distinguish which two photons from sequence SA2 and S
2
A1 form
an EPR pair. They cannot get any useful information of KB to predetermine
the final shared key. Thus, all participants involved can equally influence the
final shared key. This protocol satisfies the fairness property. And we can see
in this protocol, the sub-secret keys of each participant are kept secret during
the protocol. Even two dishonest participants cannot get any useful information
of the honest participant. Hence this protocol can reach the privacy property.
Besides, in Step 6, each participant randomly selects a set of positions to check
whether they can conclude the correct secret key at the end of the protocol,
ensuring the correctness property of this protocol.
In reality, outside eavesdroppers or inside dishonest participants may hide
their attack under the channel noises. The quantum bit error rate introduced
by channel noise is about 2%-8.9% [27,41,42,43,44,45]. But in our protocol, the
error rate introduced by outside or inside attack is at least 25%. That is, our
protocol will be immune to both the outside and inside attacks. And it can
reach the correctness, security, fairness, and privacy property which a secure
QKA protocol need to satisfy.
4 Discussion and summary
Now, we analyze the efficiency of our protocol, and show that the proposed
protocol is efficient. According to the definition proposed by Cabello [46], the
efficiency of the quantum protocol is:
η =
c
q + b
. (6)
Here, c denotes the number of the secret bits (here in QKA protocol, c denotes
the length of the classical final shared key), q refers to the number of qubits
transmitted in the quantum channel, and b is the number of classical bits ex-
changed for decoding the message. In our protocol, comparing with n, l and kn
are small quantities. So the efficiency of our protocol η ≈ 2
3
. Comparing with
previous QKA protocols under this definition of protocol efficiency, i.e. proto-
cols with single photons [15,20,27,29], protocols with Bell states [21,24,30], our
protocol possess a higher efficiency in the three-party cases. This is because of
dense-coding method which enables one qubit to carry two bits of information
being used in the protocol. It should make sense that we use the method of
inserting some single photons rather than using control strings and performing
rotation operations [26,27,29] to prevent the inside attacks. With one encoding
operation being performed, participant in those protocols can only encode one
bit information on one photon while he can encode two bits in our protocol.
In order to decode the message, participants in Ref.[26,27,29] need to exchange
their control strings which are as long as the final shared key. While in our pro-
tocol, they only need to exchange very little information about the positions of
those single photons. Thus, our protocol is easier to be implemented with less
operations performed and less classical bits exchanged under this three-party
condition.
According to the classification standard described in Ref. [14], our protocol is
a circle-type QKA protocol. And our protocol is not sensitive to collusive attacks
(or called inside attacks) according to the above security analysis. Two-photon
entangled states and single-photon states are used as the information carriers
in our protocol, they can be prepared and controlled[47,48,49,50,51] even at
a great distance. And photon states are also of great use in other fields, such
as quantum computation[52,53,54,55] and quantum simulation[56,57]. We utilize
the Bell measurement to deduce the final secret key. Four polarization-entangled
Bell states can be completely distinguished by the complete Bell state analysis
method [58]. Hence, our protocol is feasible under the current technologies and
it can be implemented in realistic devices. Certainly, in a practical application
of this QKA protocol with a noisy environment, some useful methods should
be exploited to depress the influence of noise, such as decoherence-free subspace
[59,60,61,62], self-error-rejecting transmission [63,64,65,66], error correction with
ancillary qubits [67], entanglement purification [68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83],
and entanglement concentration [84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92].
In summary, we have proposed a three-party quantum key agreement proto-
col with Bell states and quantum dense-coding method. We have analyzed the
security of our protocol, showing that it is immune to both outside and inside
attacks. And it can achieve the the correctness, security, fairness, and privacy
property at the same time. Further more, compared with other protocols under
this three-party condition, it is also a high-efficiency protocol.
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